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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
Modifying the 2°C Target: 
Climate Policy Objectives in the Contested Terrain 
of Scientific Policy Advice, Political Preferences, and 
Rising Emissions 
In the twenty years since the United Nations (UN) 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was 
adopted, progress in the area of international climate 
policy has been modest at best. Annual greenhouse 
gas emissions have increased by over one-third since 
1992. Acute conflicts of interest among industrialized, 
emerging, and developing countries remain a per-
sistent obstacle. A comprehensive global climate 
treaty will not be concluded until 2015 at the earliest, 
and it will not enter into force before 2020. One of the 
few points of general consensus in the international 
community is on the overarching objective of limiting 
the global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius 
in order to avoid crossing the threshold into “danger-
ous climate change.” 
Although the European Union (EU) had already 
started to campaign for the 2°C target in the mid-
1990s, this target was not formally adopted until 2010 
at the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún. If 
one is to accept key findings from climate research 
and the recommendations from scientific policy ad-
visors, emissions will have to be reduced significantly 
between 2010 and 2020 to stay below the 2°C limit. 
Yet given that global emissions trends are moving 
in the opposite direction and will be impossible to 
reverse in a matter of a few years, this goal is patently 
unrealistic. And since a target that is obviously un-
attainable cannot fulfill either a positive symbolic 
function or a productive governance function, the 
primary target of international climate policy will 
have to be modified. 
The present study has been written to address 
this void. Its express aim is to stand apart from the 
innumerable studies detailing theoretically possible 
measures to avoid crossing the 2°C threshold. Instead, 
this paper provides the first systematic analysis of pos-
sible options for modifying the 2°C target. A particu-
lar focus is placed here on the relationship between 
climate science and climate policy. 
Contrary to widespread hopes, the global agree-
ment on the 2°C target has contributed little to the 
implementation of ambitious policy measures world-
wide. The target currently serves a primarily symbolic 
Problems and Recommendations 
SWP Berlin 
Modifying the 2°C Target 
June 2013 
 
 
 
6 
and declarative function. For this reason, a pragmat-
ically motivated reduction in the level of political 
ambition carries risks. This is particularly critical for 
the EU, which has gained worldwide recognition as a 
leader in climate policy, not least because of its role 
in bringing the 2°C target into the international cli-
mate policy arena and successfully pushing through 
its adoption as a global limit. But the EU not only risks 
damage to its public image. Since Europeans derive 
their internal emissions reduction objective of 80–95 
percent (compared to 1990 levels) by 2050 directly 
from the 2°C target, a weakening of the global climate 
policy target would inevitably lead in turn to a debate 
over the easing of EU reduction targets. This could 
become a highly controversial issue in the coming 
years, when the EU has to decide on its legally binding 
emissions target for 2030. 
Despite the dwindling probability that the estab-
lished goal can still be met, there has been no broad 
discussion to date about the future of the 2°C target. 
There is no “Plan B.” As global emissions continue to 
rise, the EU will not be able to avoid this question 
much longer. The heads of state and government 
of EU Member States who hold the decision-making 
power in this area will have to develop clear ideas 
about how a change in the target formula can be 
achieved in conformity with Member States’ interests 
in climate, foreign, and economic policy. 
Since scientists have a very influential position in 
global climate discourse, and since the current target 
formula is explicitly “science-based,” policy makers 
will not be able to modify the target on their own. But 
to be able to identify the potentials and legitimate 
grounds for modifying the 2°C target, climate policy 
makers must engage critically with the target formula 
and the emissions reduction paths that have been 
derived from it. From the perspective of climate 
policy, the 2°C target may still be considered sacro-
sanct in the EU, but from the perspective of climate 
science, it is entirely questionable. 
The various options for modifying the 2°C target 
can be differentiated first and foremost by the level of 
intervention involved. A reinterpretation of the current 
target would entail adjusting certain assumptions of 
climate economics in order to temporarily avoid the 
crucial “make-or-break” point of the 2°C target—the 
last possible year in which global emissions would 
have to peak. Possible starting points for such an ap-
proach could be found in the uncertainties that exist 
within climate and energy system models, but also in 
the more fundamental question of whether the 2°C 
target should still be understood as an absolute upper 
limit or whether it might be a threshold that could 
be crossed temporarily. While the reinterpretation ap-
proach strives for an indirect and politically less risky 
path to reducing ambition levels, the revision approach 
takes a direct route. This could mean accepting a less 
ambitious global target that would be significantly 
higher than 2°C or even giving up a specific global 
stabilization target altogether. 
The EU will probably favor a reinterpretation over 
a revision of the 2°C target. However, that does not 
mean its preferences will necessarily prevail. What 
ultimately happens will be determined by the actions 
of major emitters like China and the USA, and even 
more by how global emissions levels evolve over the 
next several years. If the trend is not reversed soon, 
a reinterpretation of the 2°C target might not be 
enough. If the EU wants to maintain its role as a glob-
al leader in climate policy, it will have to investigate 
all options for target modification as soon as possible—
even those that seem politically unappealing. 
No matter which option the EU chooses to pursue 
in the medium term, and which one is ultimately 
adopted in international climate policy, the relation-
ship between climate policy and climate science will 
undoubtedly become much more pragmatic. The need 
to reinterpret or revise the 2°C target arises primarily 
from international climate policy’s lack of success. Yet 
its failure is also the failure of the dominant approach 
to policy advice up to now: the attempt to delimit the 
range of options available to climate policy by estab-
lishing “science-based” climate objectives. What 
seemed to be a non-negotiable planetary boundary 
will be subject to (more or less publicly visible) re-
negotiation. 
In the future, climate policy and climate research 
will be much less mutually dependent. To remain 
relevant, scientific policy advisors will have to cease 
to issue absolute demands as if these were the only 
alternatives available to policy makers. Science-based 
climate policy advice should confine itself to present-
ing the preconditions and consequences of specific 
policy options rather than seeking a role as a de facto 
political actor. This would enable climate policy 
makers to reach more informed decisions about the 
various options available at an earlier stage. 
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Status and Functions of the 2°C Target 
 
In international climate policy, there is broad con-
sensus, at least formally, on the necessity of limiting 
the increase in the global average temperature to a 
maximum of 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The 
definition of 2°C as the threshold beyond which the 
consequences of climate change could spin out of 
control has been the most successful attempt to date 
to translate the relatively abstract demands in Article 
2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) into concrete guidelines.1 
The Convention states: “The ultimate objective of this 
Convention [...] is to achieve [...] stabilization of green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system.”2
The Establishment of the 2°C Target in 
Climate Policy 
 
Members of the climate policy community often em-
phasize that the 2°C target is a figure derived from 
scientific research. Scientists themselves, however, are 
generally well aware that this target is more political 
in nature—another target could have been set just 
as easily. Scientific research on climate change has 
reported numerous indications that 2°C could be an 
advisable guideline, but has not produced clear evi-
dence that this precise figure is imperative.3
 
1  Michael Oppenheimer and Annie Petsonk, “Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC: Historical Origins, Recent Interpretations,” Climatic 
Change 73, no. 3 (2005): 195–226. 
 As a 
result, only a part of the scientific community actively 
promotes the 2°C target. Contrary to a widespread 
misconception, none of the Assessment Reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
2  United Nations (UN), United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (New York: UN, 1992). 
3  Béatrice Cointe, Paul-Alain Ravon, and Emmanuel Guérin, 
2°C: The History of a Policy-Science Nexus, IDDRI Working Paper 
19/2011 (Paris: Institut du développement durable et des rela-
tions internationales, 2011); Joel B. Smith et al., “Assessing 
Dangerous Climate Change through an Update of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ‘Reasons for 
Concern’,” in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America (PNAS) 106, no. 11 (2009): 4133–37. 
have ever made an explicit case for the 2°C target. The 
first analysis of whether and how this goal can still 
be reached will be published in the IPCC’s Fifth Assess-
ment Report. Numerous prominent climate research-
ers and policy advisory bodies such as the German 
Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) have been 
arguing since the mid-1990s for the establishment of 
a 2°C limit. However, the active engagement of the 
European Union was the crucial factor in achieving 
international agreement on the 2°C target.4
European climate policy was early to recognize the 
2°C limit as an effective means of operationalizing the 
stabilization objective formulated in Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC. European environmental ministers adopted 
their first resolution on the matter in 1996. At the 
spring summit of the European Council in 2005, 
the heads of state and government finally approved 
the target. In 2007, the question of how to actually 
achieve this target was addressed in the first European 
Energy Strategy. There, the 2°C threshold served as 
a “strategic target” which, if pursued, would lead to 
a sustainable, secure, and competitive energy supply 
in Europe. The targets currently under consideration 
in the EU—an 80 to 95 percent reduction in emissions 
(compared to the base year 1990) by 2050—are derived 
directly from the global 2°C target.
 
5
 
4  On the evolution of the 2°C target, see Carlo C. Jaeger and 
Julia Jaeger, Three Views of Two Degrees, ECF Working Paper 
2/2010 (Potsdam: European Climate Forum [ECF], 2010; 
Samuel Randalls, “History of the 2°C Climate Target” WIREs 
Climate Change 1, no. 4 (2010): 598–605; Richard S. J. Tol, 
“Europe’s Long-term Climate Target: A Critical Evaluation” 
Energy Policy 35, no.1 (2007): 424–32; Cointe, Ravon, and 
Guérin, Policy-Science Nexus (see note 
 Since 2007, the 
EU has succeeded in gradually gaining support for this 
target from all its most important negotiation 
partners—even China, India, and the USA. In the 
3). 
5  Council of the European Communities, 1939. Meeting of the 
Council (Environment), doc. 8518/96 (Brussels, June 25, 1996); 
Council of the European Union, Meeting of the European Council 
– Presidency Conclusions, doc. 7619/1/05 REV 1 (Brussels, March 
22 and 23, 2005); Council of the European Union, Brussels 
European Council – Presidency Conclusions, doc. 7224/1/07 (Brus-
sels, March 8 and 9, 2007); European Commission, A Road-
map for Moving to a Competitive Low-carbon Economy in 2050, 
COM(2011) 112 (Brussels, March 8, 2011). 
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8 
Cancún Agreements, which were approved at the 2010 
United Nations Climate Change Conference, the 2°C 
target was adopted for the first time by a Conference 
of the Parties to the UNFCCC: “[The Conference of the 
Parties, COP] further recognizes that deep cuts in 
global greenhouse gas emissions are required ac-
cording to science, […] so as to hold the increase in 
global average temperature below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels.”6 To date, however, there has been 
no agreement at the UN level on a package of mea-
sures that would allow this target to be reached.7
A climate policy that proclaims the 2°C limit as its 
credo creates high expectations and puts itself under 
enormous pressure to show results. The difference 
between the current average global temperature and 
the historic climate data from the pre-industrial age 
is estimated to be around 0.8°C. Due to the relative 
inertia of the climate system and the long lifespan 
of many greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere, 
even global emissions up to the present date will 
result in an additional temperature increase of at least 
0.5°C.
 
8 Every step toward reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions today will only affect the earth’s tempera-
ture several decades in the future. Even if the world’s 
biggest emitters make good on their promised reduc-
tions the 2°C limit will be surpassed significantly.9
 
6  UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.16 – The Cancun Agreements: Outcome 
of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (March 15, 
2011). 
 In 
light of this fact, it was decided at the UN Climate 
Conference in Cancún that a review would be con-
ducted from 2013 to 2015 to assess whether the emis-
sion reduction measures undertaken up to that point 
have been consistent with the 2°C target. The Parties 
7  The timetable adopted at the Conference of the Parties 
in Durban in 2011 (COP 17) envisions that a global treaty on 
emissions reductions will be agreed upon by 2015 (COP 21) 
and will enter into force in 2020. The attempts made to reach 
such a comprehensive agreement have failed regularly to 
date, most recently in the “Bali Action Plan,” passed in 2007, 
which should have been adopted at the 2009 Climate Summit 
in Copenhagen (COP 15). 
8  Veerabhadran Ramanathan and Yangyang Xu, “The 
Copenhagen Accord for Limiting Global Warming: Criteria, 
Constraints, and Available Avenues,” PNAS 107, no. 18 (2010): 
8055–62; WBGU, Climate Change: Why 2°C?, Factsheet 2/2009 
(Berlin, 2009). 
9  International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2012 
(Paris, 2012), 241ff.; Joeri Rogelj et al., “Analysis of the Copen-
hagen Accord Pledges and Its Global Climatic Impacts—a 
Snapshot of Dissonant Ambitions,” Environmental Research Let-
ters 5, no. 3 (2010): 1–9. 
to the UNFCCC also decided that a debate should 
take place following the publication of the IPCC’s Fifth 
Assessment Report, which is scheduled to be pub-
lished in 2013 and 2014, on whether the temperature 
target should be changed from 2°C to 1.5°C. 
The Problem-Centered Approach—
Formulating a Science-Based Target 
International climate policy has been defined for two 
decades by the paradigm of a “problem-centered,” 
top-down governance approach. This approach focuses 
first on establishing a limit grounded in scientific 
research that defines what is still a tolerable level 
of climate change. In the second step, the resulting 
threshold value is used to determine a global emis-
sions reduction target. Finally, regulations are formu-
lated that establish how the reductions determined 
to be necessary by this method (or conversely: the 
remaining emissions rights) should be distributed 
among individual states, preferably through a UN 
treaty that is binding under international law.10
With the agreement on the 2°C target, internation-
al climate policy made a “scientized” global target the 
centerpiece of its activities and its communications 
with the public. Although the ultimate decision on 
the exact maximum temperature limit is in the hands 
of politicians, they cannot make this decision indepen-
dent of the climate research community—particularly 
since global climate policy leaders such as the EU have 
always declared their policies to be “science-based.” 
Whereas policy makers relinquish all authority to 
determine which global emissions reduction paths 
should be derived from the 2°C target, they act vir-
tually autonomously in the final step in this process—
the UN negotiations over the allocation of emissions 
reduction commitments among nation states. Yet in 
this top-down discourse, negotiations do not seem to 
constitute an independent level of activity but merely 
the transposition of scientifically “imperative” targets 
and reduction paths into policies.
 
11
 
10  In contrast to widespread assumptions, the focus of the 
top-down approach to climate policy is not on the preferred 
level of political action (UN system) but the overarching 
policy goal (limiting global warming to 2°C), with all further 
steps being derived from this goal; see William Hare et al., 
“The Architecture of the Global Climate Regime: A Top-down 
Perspective,” Climate Policy 10, no. 6 (2010): 600–14. 
 In contrast to an 
11  On the interactions between climate science and climate 
policy, see Roger A. Pielke Jr., The Honest Broker. Making Sense 
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“actor-centered” perspective, which takes the existing 
limitations on action in the international political 
system as its starting point and exercises caution in 
assessing the global climate regime’s ability to solve 
the problem in the short to medium term, the “prob-
lem-centered” approach assumes that effective global 
governance structures must and can be established 
within a matter of years. This explains why interna-
tional climate policy’s failure to reach agreement on 
reduction commitments in line with the 2°C target 
has not led to critical re-examination of the target, but 
only to criticism of the industrialized and emerging 
economies’ leaders for their “lack of political will to 
take action.” 
In European and international climate policy, 
consensus on the 2°C target is so solid that the means 
by which this limit was arrived at are hardly given a 
second thought, despite numerous scientific uncer-
tainties.12 Climate policy debates neglect to mention, 
for example, that the category of “global average tem-
perature” is not a simple measurement but a complex 
statistical construct, a product of values taken from 
thousands of measuring stations across the globe that 
must be related to each other in a meaningful way. In 
other words, scientists do not just create an average of 
all the temperatures measured, but carry out theory-
based adjustments to correct for distortions that 
result from, for example, the unequal distribution of 
measuring stations across the globe or effects from 
urban settlements located nearby.13
 
of Science in Policy and Politics (Cambridge, 2007); particularly 
for the case of the IPCC see Silke Beck, “Moving beyond the 
Linear Model of Expertise? IPCC and the Test of Adaptation,” 
Regional Environmental Change 11, no. 2 (2010): 297–306. 
 The task outlined 
in Article 2 of the UNFCCC establishing a boundary 
between dangerous and non-dangerous climate 
change is also fraught with scientific uncertainties. 
The Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC expresses 
12  The numerous uncertainties in climate science are often 
unknown in the sphere of climate policy because they tend 
to be obscured by median values and best estimates. For a 
discussion of the obstacles to a critical examination of quan-
titative knowledge, see Bettina Heintz, “Zahlen, Wissen, 
Objektivität: Wissenschaftssoziologische Perspektiven,” in 
Zahlenwerk. Kalkulation, Organisation und Gesellschaft, ed. Andrea 
Mennicken and Hendrik Vollmer (Wiesbaden, 2007), 65–85. 
13  Kevin E. Trenberth et al., “Observations: Surface and 
Atmospheric Climate Change—Appendix 3.B: Techniques, 
Error Estimation and Measurement Systems,” in Climate 
Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis – Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, ed. Susan 
Solomon et al. (Cambridge and New York, 2007), SM.3-1– 
SM.3-11. 
strong doubts about whether it is expedient to use just 
one index in the assessment of climate risks14: such an 
approach does not provide a basis for predicting what 
global average temperature will still be “safe” in a few 
decades, no matter how “safety” is defined. The use 
of a single global threshold as a benchmark is already 
questionable because temperatures and sea levels will 
change differently from region to region. Negative 
climate change impacts are likely to begin appearing 
in many countries long before the global 2°C limit has 
been reached, but in some countries they will appear 
only later. Most importantly, the establishment of 
an absolute threshold for dangerous climate change 
obscures the fact that in a changing world climate, 
“security” will depend critically on the societal capac-
ities available in individual countries to cope with fun-
damentally new climatic situations.15
Despite the many uncertainties inherent in it, 
2°C has been able to prevail as the global temperature 
threshold. It functions as the central point of refer-
ence in the climate debate, and as the one concrete 
objective on which key actors from policy, media, 
and research have been able to reach at least interim 
agreement. A central factor in the success of the 2°C 
target is the relative ease of communicating and inter-
preting a temperature category in the form of a whole 
number compared to other scientific categories such 
as the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases 
(measured in parts per million, ppm) or radiative 
forcing (measured in watts per square meter, W/m2). 
The decision to establish a fixed limit using a tempe-
rature category with no fractional numbers represents 
the desire to reduce complexity and the desire to 
claim objectivity joined together in a mutually bene-
ficial synergy. This gives the 2°C target a high level 
of discursive versatility for application within the 
climate debate, but it also leads to many false con-
clusions.
 
16
 
14  Stephen Schneider et al., “Assessing Key Vulnerabilities 
and the Risk from Climate Change,” Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability – Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, ed. Martin L. 
Parry et al. (Cambridge and New York, 2007), 779–810. 
 In an endeavor to downplay ambiguities 
in the description of causal chains, climate policy 
and the media have tended to edit out not only the  
15  Bruce T. Anderson, “Intensification of Seasonal Extremes 
Given a 2°C Global Warming Target,” Climatic Change 112, 
no. 2 (2012): 325–37; Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree about Cli-
mate Change. Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity 
(Cambridge, 2009), 191ff. 
16  Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers. The Pursuit of Objectivity 
in Science and Public Life (Princeton, 1995). 
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Figure 1 
Greenhouse Gas Concentrations and Likely (> 66%) 
Maximum Temperature Rise before 2100 (in ppm CO2e) 
Source: Rogelj et al., “Supplementary Information,” in “Emis-
sions Pathways” (see note 19), 6. 
numerous uncertainties inherent in predicting con-
crete effects of a global temperature increase to 2°C, 
but also the wide range of projections that have been 
made regarding what specific atmospheric concentra-
tion of greenhouse gases17 will lead to what specific 
temperature effect. The ongoing improvement of 
climate models will by no means narrow the range 
of these uncertainties but instead will widen it. As 
improved computing capabilities allow scientists to 
integrate an increasing number of climate-relevant 
factors into their models, the variety of possible cli-
mate scenarios will also increase.18
For this reason, it is also impossible to use climate 
models to definitively say what total global level of 
 
 
17  In addition to carbon dioxide (CO2) this includes methane, 
ozone, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons. Their concen-
tration in the earth’s atmosphere is relatively low, but their 
warming potential is much higher than that of CO2. 
18  Kevin Trenberth, “More Knowledge, Less Certainty,” Nature 
Reports Climate Change 4 (February 2010): 20f. For a description 
of the policy-relevant uncertainty factors in climate model-
ing, see United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The 
Emissions Gap Report. Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to 
Limit Global Warming to 2°C or 1.5°C? A Preliminary Assessment 
(Nairobi, 2010); Céline Guivarch and Stéphane Hallegatte, “2C 
or not 2C?,” Global Environmental Change 23 (2013): 179–92. 
emissions or greenhouse gas concentrations (ex-
pressed in CO2-equivalents, CO2e) would be acceptable 
under a given temperature target for 2100.19 To trans-
late this exceptionally important relation for climate 
policy into comprehensible terms, one must first 
define a desired probability of reaching a given tem-
perature target. On this basis, the range of maximum 
values can be determined (see Figure 1). Thus, if one 
wants to limit the temperature increase in the twenty-
first century to 2°C at a (standard) probability of at 
least 67 percent, the range of admissible greenhouse 
gas concentrations would be 400–486 ppm CO2e. For 
a target of 2.5°C, the corridor would be 422–557 ppm 
CO2e. This has two implications: (1) If one wants to 
limit the increase to 2°C, it may be enough to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations at 486 ppm; however, 
in the worst case, even 400 ppm would bring about a 
temperature effect of 2°C. (2) Although international 
climate policy proceeds on the unquestioned assump-
tion that it would be possible to adhere to the 2°C tar-
get with a (quite ambitious) stabilization at 450 ppm 
CO2e, it is quite possible based on current climate 
research that this concentration would cause a tem-
perature increase of 2.5°C.20
The Carbon Budget Approach 
 
Over the past several years, a strategy known as the 
“budget approach” has gained prominence in science-
based climate policy advice. It allows for relatively 
straightforward conclusions to be drawn from the 2°C 
target about the total amount of greenhouse gases 
that may still be emitted worldwide. Yet the persisting 
uncertainties in climate science are only mentioned in 
passing and hardly taken into consideration in the cli-
mate policies produced through this strategy. The con-
clusions drawn using the budget approach are indeed  
 
19  Joeri Rogelj et al., “Emissions Pathways Consistent with a 
2°C Global Temperature Limit,” Nature Climate Change 1 (2011): 
413–18. 
20  It should be kept in mind that concentration targets such 
as 450 ppm CO2e—in contrast to temperature targets like 
2°C—are not understood as an absolute upper limit that can-
not under any circumstances be temporarily exceeded, but 
as a stabilization objective to be reached in the medium to 
long term. The greenhouse gas concentration may indeed 
overshoot the value of 450 ppm for several decades if it can 
then be reduced and stabilized below a threshold value. See 
OECD, OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050. The Consequences of 
Inaction (Paris, 2012), 111ff. 
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Figure 2 
Illustration of Different Emission Pathway Types for Identical Carbon Budgets 
Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2010 (see note 18), 11. 
 
“defining the reality” of the current climate discourse 
to a significant extent. 
The carbon budget approach has been used success-
fully to overcome the narrow focus on the long-term 
percentage reduction targets that predominated for so 
long. Climate scientists no longer concentrate on the 
(provisional) end points of emission curves, but on 
their paths over time. Discussions no longer revolve 
around reduction targets for the year 2050—such as 
50 percent lower emissions worldwide or 80–95 per-
cent lower emissions in the industrialized countries. 
Rather, the objective now is to calculate a maximum 
total amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted 
up to 2050 or 2100. This approach is not only much 
more suited to the problem than is the focus on selec-
tive long-term reduction targets; it also has implica-
tions for the medium-term course of emission paths. 
Carbon budget studies based on the 2°C target assume 
that global emissions, which have increased by almost 
40 percent worldwide since 1990, will continue to 
increase over the next few years but will soon reach 
their peak and then begin to decline drastically.21
 
21  An annually updated summary of current research is pro-
vided by the United Nations Environmental Programme; 
see UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2012. A UNEP Synthesis Report 
(Nairobi, 2012). 
 A 
number of different emissions reduction paths are 
conceivable, even within a set budget for total emis-
sions defined by climate science. However, as a rule, 
the higher the peak turns out to be and the later it is 
reached, the greater the subsequent annual reduction 
rates will have to be in order to remain within the 
total emissions budget (see Figure 2). 
However, there are some limiting factors to consid-
er. The annual reduction rates that will be necessary 
after the emissions peak is reached in order not to 
exceed the total global carbon budget cannot be set 
arbitrarily at any level, no matter how high. Currently 
3 percent per year is considered the upper limit for 
what is economically and technologically feasible.22
Up until 2009, policy recommendations from cli-
mate scientists emphasized that the global emissions 
peak would have to be reached in the second decade of 
the twenty-first century, that is, by 2020 at the latest. 
Following the Copenhagen Climate Summit, however, 
another figure quickly emerged that further limited 
the options open to climate policy. To accurately eval- 
 
For this reason, carbon budget studies usually cite 
the last possible year that the peak must be reached 
to stay within the 2°C limit with a sufficient degree 
of probability. 
 
22  Ibid., 3. Global estimates of feasibility in climate-economic 
models usually relate only to the economic and technological 
dimensions, but rarely to the—virtually unquantifiable—polit-
ical and social dimensions; see Brigitte Knopf et al., “Manag-
ing the Low Carbon Transition—From Model Results to Pol-
icies,” The Energy Journal 31, Special Issue 1 (2010): 223–45; 
Guivarch and Hallegatte, “2C or not 2C?” (see note 18); Glen 
Peters et al., “The challenge to keep global warming below 
2°C,” Nature Climate Change 3 (2013): 4–6. Just how ambitious 
a global annual reduction rate of 3 percent is can be shown 
by a comparison with the EU, whose emissions reduction be-
tween 1990 and 2010 was on average below 1 percent per 
year. 
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Figure 3 
Historic Emissions and Predicted Course of Emissions Based on the  
Current Reduction Pledges 
Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2012 (see note 21); De Vit and Höhne, Why the Durban Outcome Is Not Sufficient (see note 23). 
 
uate progress meeting the reduction commitments 
for 2020 that had been pledged by industrialized and 
emerging countries in Copenhagen, a global emissions 
benchmark was introduced for the end of the decade: 
44 gigatons (Gt) CO2e. This made it clear, as Figure 3 
shows, not only that there is a significant gap between 
reduction pledges made in Copenhagen, which are 
not binding under international law, and the levels 
required by the 2°C target (emissions gap), but also that 
the current level of emissions (50 Gt) is more than 10 
percent higher than the proposed maximum level 
for 2020.23
 
23  UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2012 (see note 
 Therefore—in contrast to what was long 
thought to be true—in order to achieve the 2°C target, 
it will not suffice to reach the emissions peak at the 
end of the current decade. The trend reversal has to 
take place several years before that point, and it must 
be followed by significant emissions reductions 
through to 2020. 
21), 24f.; 
Caroline De Vit and Niklas Höhne, Why the Durban Outcome 
Is Not Sufficient for Staying below 2°C, Policy Update 3 (Cologne: 
Ecofys, February 2012). 
The constraints established in the carbon budget 
approach are of enormous significance for climate 
policy. Due to political and economic path-dependen-
cies, it will be possible to predict both the earliest 
date of the global emissions peak and the minimum 
expected emissions level for 2020 several years in ad-
vance. However, an emissions peak compatible with 
the 2°C target is now almost impossible to reach. 
Evidence of its improbability can be seen in the paths 
of industrialization and energy supply taken by 
the major emerging economies, the continuing non-
binding nature of reduction pledges in the UNFCCC 
process, and the time schedule agreed upon in Durban 
for an international climate treaty. It is therefore 
likely that increasing numbers of climate scientists 
will rule out the possibility of achieving the 2°C target 
in the coming years24
 
24  A few such voices are already being heard; see, e.g., Geof-
frey J. Blanford, Richard G. Richels, and Thomas F. Ruther-
ford, “Feasible Climate Targets: The Roles of Economic 
Growth, Coalition Development and Expectations,” Energy 
Economics 31 (2009): S82–S93; Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows, 
—decades before the 2°C limit 
will actually be reached. 
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Political vs. Scientific Logic 
In the framework of the top-down paradigm, the 2°C 
target has been serving for almost two decades as a 
common reference point for climate policy and cli-
mate science, as a “boundary object” that allows these 
two very different spheres to communicate and inter-
act productively. But although policy and science have 
“co-produced” the 2°C target, they each use this target 
in markedly different ways.25
Should the mainstream of climate science begin 
to accept that the international community will prob-
ably fail to meet this central objective, the 2°C target 
will lose its extraordinary status. For national govern-
ments that have assumed a leading role in the global 
climate regime, such as those in Europe, it is not 
realistic to continue to pursue goals that are patent-
ly unachievable or to work on obviously unsolvable 
problems. Furthermore, the increasingly palpable 
 In climate policy, the 
2°C target has served primarily as a prominent sym-
bol of the orientation toward an ambitious, yet still 
(if only barely) attainable global emissions mitigation 
agenda. In climate science, on the other hand, the 
target is used as the basis for complex calculations, 
especially to determine target-compatible carbon 
budgets and emissions reduction paths. These two 
functional logics have long enjoyed a mutually sup-
portive relationship. Efforts to raise the status of 
climate policy have gained scientific legitimacy, while 
climate research has found a growing political con-
sensus and increased societal relevance, reflected not 
least of all in significantly improved funding. But the 
longer it takes to reverse global emissions trends, 
the more difficult it will become to maintain the 
harmonious relationship between the political and 
symbolic dimension of the 2°C goal and the scien-
tific and calculative dimension. 
 
“Beyond ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change: Emission Scenarios 
for a New World,” Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society 
369 (2011): 20–44; PricewaterhouseCoopers, Too Late for Two 
Degrees? Low Carbon Economy Index 2012 (London, November 
2012). 
25  Cointe, Ravon and Guérin, Policy-Science Nexus (see note 3), 
18ff.; Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things 
Out. Classification and its Consequences (Cambridge, 2000), 296ff.; 
Sheila Jasanoff, “Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society,” 
States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order, 
ed. Sheila Jasanoff (London, 2004), 13–45. For an insightful 
empirical analysis of the usages of the 2°C target in the UK 
see Christopher Shaw, “Choosing a dangerous limit for cli-
mate change: Public representations of the decision making 
process,” Global Environmental Change 23 (2013): 563–71. 
consequences of climate change will soon close off an 
avenue that was still open in the 1990s—that of tem-
porarily removing climate change from the political 
agenda. This will make it necessary to modify the cur-
rently almost undisputed 2°C target in the years to 
come. Pressure is mounting for change, not only in 
the target formula but also in the level of ambition 
that has been declared in international and European 
climate policy. This has the potential to bring about a 
fundamental transformation in the working relation-
ship that has existed between EU climate policy and 
climate science since the early 1990s. 
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Focus: 
The Political Characteristics of the 2°C Target from the Perspective of the EU 
In the European Union, decisions about the fun-
damental direction of climate policy are not made 
by sectoral policy makers but by the European 
Council, through a consensus of the currently 27 
heads of state and government of the EU Member 
States. These decisions are prepared by the Euro-
pean Commission as well as the Council of the 
European Union, but without any significant input 
from the European Parliament. The decisions of 
the heads of state and government influence not 
only international climate policy negotiations but 
also the global competitiveness of European busi-
nesses, competition among European economies, 
and national climate and energy policies. Given 
the enormous challenges that will arise as climate 
change continues, the media, the scientific com-
munity, and even scientific policy advisors usually 
fail to acknowledge that for Member State govern-
ments, climate policy is just one of many policy 
areas of pressing concern. 
Attempts to solve environmental problems 
through climate policy are inseparable from the 
rules of the political process—whether at the Mem-
ber State, EU, or UN level. Policies are inconceivable 
without politics, and policy objectives are not pur-
sued independently of political power objectives—a 
rule that applies even to the area of sustainability 
policy.a Decisions made at the EU level in response 
to the impending failure to meet the 2°C target 
will therefore not be based purely on rational or 
even scientific considerations. The European heads 
of state and government will always examine such 
considerations for their broader political rationali-
ty. This does not necessarily mean that ambitious 
climate goals are impossible. The dynamic that 
brought about the European Council’s sweeping 
decisions on climate and energy policy in March 
2007—following the failed EU Constitutional Refer-
enda in France and the Netherlands—was indeed 
driven by a desire to publicly demonstrate the 
value of deeper European integration by taking 
on crucial issues for the future.b 
The historic evolution of international climate 
policy clearly shows that political problems do not 
exist in any inherent, a priori sense. They only  
 arise when it appears possible to reverse the un-
desired effects by human intervention—a question 
that forms the crux of the dispute over human-
induced vs. natural climate change—and when 
political actors begin working to bring about 
change.c The political sphere is usually not capable 
of creating the necessary provisions on its own, 
however. The definition of the problem contained 
in Article 2 UNFCCC (“dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”) could only 
be formulated through discursive interactions 
with the spheres of climate science, media, busi-
ness, and civil society. Yet eighteen years passed 
from the Climate Framework Convention of 1992 
until formal consensus was reached on how to 
translate the problem into a concrete interim 
target (the 2°C limit) at the Conference of the 
Parties (COP 16) to the UNFCCC in Cancún. This 
reveals a significant divergence in the two basic 
functions of international climate policy objec-
tives.d On the one hand, the 2°C limit fulfills a 
symbolic and declarative function, particularly by 
establishing a common understanding of an upper 
temperature limit to climate change. It has indeed 
lent a certain degree of scientific legitimacy to EU 
climate policy makers’ ambitions since the deci-
sions of the Environment Council of 1996. Leading 
up to the decision at the UN climate summit of 
2010 in Cancún, the campaign for the 2°C target 
also allowed the EU to clearly establish its position 
as a global climate policy leader, which has been 
greeted with a positive response in many EU Mem-
ber States. On the other hand, however, the 2°C 
target may not be able to fulfill the function of 
providing political guidance for the problem-solving 
process, especially due to the long-postponed agree-
ment in the UNFCCC framework and the increase 
of more than one-third in global emissions. Since 
the Conference of the Parties in Cancún, no agree-
ment has been reached on any appropriate pack-
age of measures. This is also not likely to come 
about in the near future, since it would require 
levels of emissions reductions that—at least from 
the viewpoints of the respective governments—no 
longer appear politically feasible in many indus-
trialized and emerging economies. 
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Since the 2°C target is based at its core on scien-
tific parameters, it is difficult for policy makers 
to apply a predominantly political logic when 
evaluating the success of climate policy. After all, 
the more precisely a policy goal is defined, the 
greater its risk of failure. Since an objective widely 
considered unattainable cannot fulfill a positive 
symbolic or a productive governance function, the 
2°C target will inevitably have to be modified. 
 
 a Susanne Dröge (ed.), International Climate Policy. Priorities of 
Key Negotiating Parties, SWP Research Paper 2/2010 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2010). 
b Oliver Geden and Severin Fischer, Die Energie- und Klima-
politik der Europäischen Union. Bestandsaufnahme und Per-
spektiven (Baden-Baden, 2008), 113ff. 
c Deborah A. Stone, “Causal Stories and the Formation of 
Policy Agendas,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 2 (1989): 
281–300. 
d Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern 
Review (Cambridge, 2007), 318ff; David Victor, “Global 
Warming: Why the 2°C Goal Is a Political Delusion,” 
Nature 459 (2009): 909. 
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Climate Policy Objectives in the Political Process 
 
Since the decisions of the European Council in March 
2007, not only European climate policy but also EU 
energy policy has been following the “strategic objec-
tive” of helping to keep the global average tempera-
ture below the 2°C limit.26 Since then, the European 
Council, with express reference to the IPCC, has 
repeatedly stated that the EU should orient itself 
towards reducing emissions by 80–95 percent (com-
pared to 1990 levels) by 2050.27 The roadmaps for 
climate, energy, and transport submitted by the EU 
Commission in 2011 are also based on this reduction 
target.28 There will be serious consequences for the 
EU if, in the middle of the current decade, the 2°C tar-
get becomes clearly impossible to achieve and inter-
national climate policy experiences a major crisis of 
credibility as a result. First, the EU will be threatened 
with another foreign policy failure in one of the few 
fields of international policy in which it has taken a 
leading role over the last two decades.29
 
26  Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 
(see note 
 Second, the 
5), 10. The EU first stipulated this commitment 
in the form of medium-term headline targets for 2020, the 
“20-20-20” goals. From a legally binding emissions reduc-
tion target of 20 percent, the heads of state and government 
derived first a binding increase in the share of renewable 
energy sources to 20 percent, and second the legally non-
binding (“indicative”) goal of reducing energy use by 20 
percent. 
27  It has been widely overlooked that if the IPCC changes 
these numbers in one of its future Assessment Reports, the 
EU will either have to follow suit or distance itself from the 
IPCC’s findings. 
28  Severin Fischer and Oliver Geden, The EU’s Energy Roadmap 
2050: Targets without Governance, SWP Comments 8/2012 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2012). The 2050 
emissions reduction corridor of 80–95 percent only applies 
to industrialized countries, to represent their fair share in 
the context of a 50 percent global reduction, a pathway con-
sistent with achieving the 2°C target. In the EU, the 80–95 
percent corridor has gained huge prominence only since it 
was mentioned in a table within the IPCC’s Fourth Assess-
ment Report, see Sujata Gupta et al., “Policies, Instruments, 
and Co-operative Arrangements,” in Climate Change 2007: Miti-
gation – Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC, ed. Bert Metz et al. (Cambridge and New 
York 2007), 776. 
29  Sebastian Oberthür and Marc Pallemaerts (eds.), The New 
Climate Policies of the European Union (Brussels, 2010). 
EU’s internal ambitions will also likely be subject to 
critical evaluation in the areas of climate, energy, 
and ultimately also industrial policy—especially since 
enthusiasm for the EU strategy of green growth has 
been limited de facto to the northern and western 
European Member States. If the 2°C target should fail, 
not only would pressure mount to change the EU 
emissions reduction targets for 2050 that were derived 
directly from it. Even more importantly, the EU would 
be extremely cautious in establishing binding climate 
and energy policy targets for 2030, which are critically 
important at the moment for the investment behavior 
of European companies.30
Since the EU is only responsible for just over 10 per-
cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, it will not be 
able to singlehandedly move the world onto a emis-
sions reduction path in line with the 2°C limit. Even 
the negotiations roadmap unexpectedly approved at 
COP 17 in Durban is unlikely to contribute much to 
achieving the emissions reductions that are already 
necessary by 2020.
 The transformation to a 
European low-carbon economy, a process begun in 
2007 under the German EU Council presidency, would 
be interrupted if not brought entirely to a halt. 
31
 
30  Oliver Geden, “Impending Paradigm Shift. International 
Climate Negotiations and Their Impact on EU Energy Policy,” 
KAS International Reports 28, no. 9 (2012): 22–34; European 
Commission, A 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, 
COM(2013) 169 (Brussels, March 27, 2013). 
 The Europeans will therefore not 
be able to avoid confronting the looming crisis of the 
2°C target. In light of the conflicts of interest at the 
global level and the constantly rising emissions, every 
modification in the core objective of international cli-
mate policy will amount to a weakening of this target. 
As the global leader in climate policy and the political 
architect of the 2°C target, the EU can, however, exer-
cise significant influence on the direction such modifi-
cations may take. There are two fundamentally differ-
ent approaches for modifying the target: to gradually 
increase the flexibility of the 2°C target (reinterpre-
tation) or to completely change the central climate 
policy target (revision). Which of these two basic ap-
31  European Commission, The 2015 International Climate 
Change Agreement: Shaping International Climate Policy beyond 
2020, COM(2013) 167 (Brussels, March 26, 2013). 
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proaches and which specific details within each of 
them the EU will favor depends on a multitude of fac-
tors—not just the ability of a modified climate objec-
tive to address the problem in its full scope, but also 
the foreign and economic policy preferences of the EU 
and the domestic political preferences of the govern-
ments of its Member States. 
Playing an active role in the modification process 
is a politically delicate undertaking for the EU. Europe 
will have a difficult time distancing itself from the 
previous target since it wants to maintain its image 
as a leader in climate policy, to appear on the inter-
national stage as a recognized pioneer and agenda-
setter, and at the same time to create political con-
ditions that are conducive to building a European 
strategy for green growth. In its position in the inter-
national community up to now, the EU has been able 
to meet the essential criteria that justify its global 
leadership role in this policy field. The 2°C target that 
was pushed through by the Europeans was a global 
call to action, with the UNFCCC process taking center 
stage in the architecture of the global climate regime. 
In the process of target formulation and the definition 
of adequate measures, the EU assigned a major role to 
climate research. Even if internal EU climate policy 
only partially fulfills the criterion of a “science-based” 
approach in the period up to 2020,32 the EU has been 
playing a leadership role among the industrialized 
countries in the emissions reductions achieved since 
1990.33 This is enhanced by the Union’s positive role in 
the global climate regime, which includes financial 
solidarity with the countries most severely affected 
by the impacts of climate change.34
 
32  The Europeans have not yet internally adopted the emis-
sions reductions range of 25–40 percent proposed by the IPCC 
for the industrialized countries for 2020. The EU decisions 
made in 2007 only envisioned a reduction goal of 20 percent 
for 2020, which is to be tightened only when other indus-
trialized and emerging economies are also willing to make 
significant emissions reductions. 
 
33  At least according to stipulations of the UNFCCC account-
ing regime, which only considers the emissions produced 
on the territory of a particular country, but leaves aside the 
emissions embedded in the global trade of goods and raw 
materials See Steven J. Davis and Ken Caldeira, “Consump-
tion-based Accounting of CO2 Emissions,” PNAS 107, no. 12 
(2010): 5687–92; Michael Jakob and Robert Marschinski, 
“Interpreting Trade-related CO2 Emission Transfers,” Nature 
Climate Change 3 (2013), 19–23. 
34  Although it is likely that large portions of the promised 
funding will not be provided in addition but simply reallo-
cated within the existing budget for development cooper-
ation; see Martin Stadelmann, J. Timmons Roberts, and Axel 
The engagement of the EU in international climate 
policy and the question of how to provide appropriate 
financial support for developing countries would not 
be directly affected by a modification of the 2°C tar-
get. Yet even advocating a weakening of the previously 
consensual target may come at a high political cost 
to the EU. The Union would not only risk devaluing a 
huge political victory of the past; it would risk sacri-
ficing its status as a climate policy leader and possibly 
also face a serious challenge to the ongoing transfor-
mation to a European low-carbon economy—a project 
that entails significant short- to medium-term costs.35 
If the EU adopts the more pragmatic stance that the 
2°C target must be modified, it will endeavor to avoid 
unintended negative effects of this modification. In 
the critical transitional phase, two possible points of 
departure seem particularly promising, although they 
are not necessarily feasible: the strategy of avoiding 
an open break with the mainstream of climate science 
(in the form of the IPCC and its representatives), and 
the strategy of maintaining ambitious emissions 
reduction goals, if possible within the 80-95 percent 
range already envisioned up to 2050. In this way, the 
EU could attempt to achieve three objectives: to lend 
scientific legitimacy to a new target, to demonstrate 
that the previous target did not fail due to lack of 
political will on the part of the Europeans, and to 
show that the Union is not attempting to “profit” 
from a weakening of global ambition levels by using 
this process as an excuse to significantly reduce its 
own efforts.36
 
Michaelowa, Keeping a Big Promise: Options for Baselines to Assess 
‘New and Additional’ Climate Finance, CIS Working Paper 66/2010 
(Zurich: Center for Comparative and International Studies 
[CIS], November 18, 2010). 
 
35  European Commission, Roadmap for a Low-carbon Economy 
(see note 5). 
36  In order to maintain a positive image in the media and 
in the wider population, it is not absolutely necessary for EU 
climate policy to actually solve the problem of “dangerous 
climate change.” In the case of complex, global, and long-
term problems, individual governments or the EU are rather 
expected to demonstrate “competence in problem-solving”; 
see Gunnar Sjöblom, “Problems and Problem Solutions in 
Politics. Some Conceptualisations and Conjectures,” in The 
Future of Party Government, Vol. 1: Visions and Realities of Party 
Government, ed. Francis G. Castles and Rudolf Wildenmann, 
(Berlin and New York, 1986), 72–119; Nikolaos Zahariadis, 
Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy. Political Decision Making in 
Modern Democracies (Washington D.C., 2003); Nils Brunsson, 
The Organization of Hypocrisy. Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organi-
zations (Copenhagen, 2006). 
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The various options for modifying the 2°C target 
can be differentiated above all by the level of interven-
tions involved.37 While variants of the reinterpretation 
approach aim at an indirect reduction of climate pol-
icy ambitions, the revision approach calls the 2°C tar-
get fundamentally into question. The EU will probably 
prefer a reinterpretation of the 2°C target, and will be 
able to rely on the support of large parts of the climate 
research community, numerous non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and many developing countries. 
What remains uncertain, however, is whether the EU 
will be able to achieve this in the context of the inter-
national climate regime. Here, less ambitious major 
emitters will have a significant voice in determining 
the direction, especially China, India, Russia, and 
the USA.38
 
 But even more decisive will be the future 
trajectory of global greenhouse gas emissions. The 
longer it takes to reverse emissions trends and the 
weaker this reversal turns out to be, the more unlikely 
it is that a conservative reinterpretation of the 2°C 
target will suffice. If the European Union does not 
want to surrender its leadership role in international 
climate policy, it will soon have to grapple seriously 
with all the various options for a modification of the 
2°C target—including those that seem less politically 
desirable at present. 
 
 
37  Even if the two-degree limit has broad support in the cli-
mate research community, arguments favoring several other 
options can still be found in the scientific debate on advan-
tages and disadvantages of specific target categories, even in 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC; see Brian Fisher et 
al., “Issues Related to Mitigation in the Long Term Context,” 
in Climate Change 2007: Mitigation—Contribution of Working Group 
III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, ed. Bert Metz et al. 
(Cambridge and New York, 2007), 194ff. 
38  Even in the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, the USA 
succeeded in pressuring the EU to accept a compromise that 
was unpopular at the time: emissions trading, a market-based 
instrument. Today, the Europeans are its strongest advocates; 
see Chad Damro and Pilar Luaces Méndez, “Emissions Trading 
at Kyoto: From EU Resistance to Union Innovation,” Environ-
mental Politics 12, no. 2 (2003): 71–94. 
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Options for Target Modification 
 
A modification of the 2°C target is inevitable, but the 
precise form it will take is still uncertain. The follow-
ing section presents an outline of options available 
for target modification illustrating the spectrum of 
possible interventions. The four options described 
here are in no way mutually exclusive. It would cer-
tainly be possible to combine individual elements of 
them or to implement several of the options in suc-
cession. Considerations and decisions about a modi-
fied global target will be shaped by three main con-
textual factors: climate policy, climate research, and 
global greenhouse gas emissions. It is impossible 
to predict how these factors will evolve and what 
momentum they may develop. However, the specific 
path dependencies involved make it possible to iden-
tify some of the most influential variables that will 
affect developments in the period up to 2020.39
Contextual Factors 
 
The international policy process will be dominated 
until at least the end of 2015 by efforts toward a 
“grand solution” by way of a global agreement, similar 
to the period preceding COP 15 in Copenhagen in 
2009. Yet there is little chance that the desired break-
through can be achieved within the UNFCCC process 
in the time leading up to COP 21. The plan agreed on 
in Durban is ambitious: to finalize negotiations on a 
treaty that would commit all industrialized countries 
and emerging economies to stringent and binding 
reduction targets by 2015. It is highly likely that at 
least the USA will refrain from signing any such agree-
ment in the foreseeable future. For this reason among 
 
39  This chapter will not consider unforeseen or highly un-
likely events or developments (“wildcards”) that could have a 
strong impact on the course of international climate policy, 
particularly because it is impossible to predict how they 
might influence the debate on a global climate target. Such 
events could include the rapid global implementation of 
zero-emission energy technologies, dramatic advances in 
knowledge in the area of climate research (particularly in 
regard to climate sensitivity), the swift implementation 
of large-scale interventions in the climate system (geoengi-
neering), a sudden acceleration of climate change, or an ex-
tended period without a global mean temperature increase. 
others, the participation of China, India, and Russia is 
also anything but certain.40
Under the existing UNFCCC regime, a formal review 
process is agreed to be conducted between 2013 and 
2015 to assess fulfillment of the voluntary emissions 
reduction pledges made after the Copenhagen Sum-
mit and to evaluate their compatibility with the 2°C 
target. It is unlikely, however, that this review process 
will lead to an increased level of ambition within the 
current decade, despite frequently expressed hopes to 
the contrary, and although scientific advisory bodies 
have recommended such a policy, if not declared it 
absolutely essential. Moreover, the overall level of 
commitments established in a new global treaty may 
not necessarily be consistent with the 2°C target. Even 
the usually upbeat European Commission is already 
lowering expectations in this regard: “The current 
negotiations are to be guided by the long term goal 
of putting the world onto a pathway [...] below 2°C [...]. 
However, it seems unlikely that governments will 
agree precisely how the entirety of this challenge can 
be shared in an equitable manner in 2015. […] the new 
agreement must therefore also provide the tools and 
processes to enable the further strengthening of indi-
vidual and collective ambition.”
 
41
Developments in the second half of the decade will 
depend largely on the course and the outcomes of the 
 
 
40  Sven Harmeling et al., An Insufficient Breakthrough. Sum-
mary of the Climate Summit in Durban, Germanwatch (Bonn, 
December 2011); Oliver Geden, “Hope Is Not Enough in Battle 
against Climate Change,” Spiegel Online International, Novem-
ber 26, 2012; David Robinson, US Energy and Climate Change Pol-
icies—Obama’s Second Term, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
(Oxford, 2013). 
41  European Commission, The 2015 International Climate Change 
Agreement (see note 31), 4. Interestingly enough, this para-
graph resembles remarks made in a speech by Todd Stern, 
the US State Department’s Special Envoy for Climate Change 
eight months earlier, which drew strong criticism from EU 
officials at that time: “This kind of flexible, evolving legal 
agreement cannot guarantee that we meet a 2 degree goal, 
but insisting on a structure that would guarantee such a goal 
will only lead to deadlock. It is more important to start now 
with a regime that can get us going in the right direction and 
that is built in a way maximally conducive to raising ambi-
tion, spurring innovation, and building political will.” See 
Todd Stern, “Remarks at Dartmouth College,” August 2, 2012. 
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UN climate summit at the end of 2015. If that summit 
fails spectacularly on the level of Copenhagen in 2009, 
this could lead to a loss of faith in the international 
community’s problem-solving capacity and a decline 
in the general desire to work towards global cooper-
ation, and in turn to a severe loss of momentum in the 
UNFCCC process. However, even if a comprehensive, 
ambitious, and internationally binding global climate 
agreement can be sealed, it would take far longer for it 
to enter into force than previously anticipated. It took 
seven years to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which was 
much more modest in its scope and aspiration level. 
During the ratification process, aside from working 
out regulatory details, the predominant focus of inter-
national climate policy would be on trying to influ-
ence those major emitters whose behavior threatens 
to delay or even prevent the entry into force of a UN 
climate agreement. The focus here would likely once 
again be the USA, which requires a two-thirds majori-
ty in the Senate for final approval of a treaty that is 
binding under international law. Depending on how 
the ratification rules of a global climate agreement are 
stipulated, it might not be absolutely necessary for 
every major emitter to join the treaty for its entry into 
force. However, with an “opt-out” by the USA or China, 
the “grand solution” approach to international cli-
mate policy would go on indefinitely with no end in 
sight.42
As long as efforts to seal a comprehensive global cli-
mate agreement have not definitively failed, the EU 
will continue to be one of the strongest supporters of 
this approach. Pending the outcome of UNFCCC nego-
tiations, the EU will take the utmost care in its domes-
 But even if all major emitters could be brought 
into an ambitious treaty, there would still be a risk 
that the ratification process would not be concluded 
until well beyond 2020, and that global emissions 
would continue to increase alongside the ratification 
process. This would mean that the targets agreed upon 
in 2015 would have long since become obsolete and 
unrealistic by the time the treaty entered into force. 
The symbolic function of a global climate target and 
its governance function would once again be funda-
mentally disconnected. 
 
42  This would resemble a scenario developed by Evans and 
Steven already prior to Copenhagen, when they predicted 
that a failure of COP 15 might transform the UNFCCC pro-
cess into a multilateral zombie, “staggering on, but never quite 
dying—just like the Doha trade round.” See Alex Evans and 
David Steven, An Institutional Architecture for Climate Change. 
A Concept Paper (New York: Center on International Cooper-
ation, 2009), 8. 
tic climate policy to avoid making decisions that could 
be interpreted as a step away from its previous decla-
rations. Arguing that it is important to foster this 
fragile international process, the EU would rather 
postpone establishing any binding climate and energy 
targets for the period after 2020 than to make clear 
concessions on current positions in response to pres-
sure from Eastern and Southern European Member 
States.43
There is no way to predict how climate science will 
evolve in the future and what knowledge it will pro-
duce. However, we are able to see the ways that cli-
mate science informs and influences climate policy 
in a very general sense. Past experience shows that 
the publication of an IPCC Assessment Report is a 
significant stimulus to global climate discourse and, 
in Europe at least, even takes center stage in climate 
policy debates. This was seen in 2007 and is expected 
to be the case again with the Fifth Assessment Report, 
which will appear between September 2013 and Octo-
ber 2014 in a total of four volumes. With thousands 
of finely-printed pages that summarize and evaluate 
current research in climate science, the individual 
detailed accounts are less important in the reception 
of the IPCC Report than are the public statements by 
prominent climate scientists and the summary reports 
provided for policy makers. The content of these sum-
maries—as opposed to the actual Assessment Report—
is not written independently by the participating 
scientists, but must be formulated and adopted in a 
complex process with the involvement of government 
officials. The Fifth Assessment Report is not expected 
to soften previous statements of the IPCC—quite the 
opposite. Yet it will also not go so far as to reject the 
possibility of achieving the 2°C target. With the newly 
introduced RCP2.6 scenario, the Fifth Assessment 
Report will actually be the first IPCC document to 
include a detailed assessment of the conditions that 
would make it possible to reach a specific temperature 
stabilization target.
 But to send reliable investment signals to 
European companies, it will be necessary to make a 
decision on internal EU targets for 2030 no later than 
2017. Failing a positive outcome of COP 21, the global 
framework conditions for setting ambitious unilateral 
targets will not be very favorable. 
44
 
43  Geden, “Impending Paradigm Shift” (see note 
 
30); Euro-
pean Commission, A 2030 Framework (see note 30). 
44  The RCP scenarios (Representative Concentration Path-
ways) outline emissions paths linked to different stabilization 
levels of the climate system. The nomenclature of the most 
challenging scenario, RCP2.6, refers to radiative forcing, a 
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There are strong indications that pessimism about 
the feasibility of the 2°C target will increase in the 
climate science community with each passing year. 
Yet it would be impossible for individual scientists 
or research groups to seriously endanger the climate 
policy consensus around the 2°C target with their 
findings or public statements. Far more influential on 
the climate policy discourse are analyses by globally 
recognized policy institutions or assessment studies 
evaluating the current research in all its breadth. 
Since the Sixth Assessment Report will only be issued 
at the end of the decade, it is hard to estimate what 
role the IPCC would be accorded in a discussion about 
the (in-)feasibility of the 2°C target and possible alter-
natives to it. Judging from the current situation, two 
annual publications will probably shape this dis-
course: the World Energy Outlook from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) and the Emissions Gap Report from 
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 
The IEA already takes a skeptical view regarding the 
chances of achieving the 2°C objective. In the World 
Energy Outlook 2012, it concluded that without rapid 
and drastic emissions reductions, the world would 
soon find itself in a situation where the existing fossil-
fuel driven infrastructure would emit so much CO2 
over the course of its remaining lifespan that this 
would in itself exhaust an emissions budget com-
patible with the 2°C target, a situation described as 
an energy infrastructure lock-in.45
 
category widely used in climate science. Long-term stabili-
zation at 2.6 W/m2 corresponds roughly to a temperature in-
crease of 2°C; see Detlef P. van Vuuren et al., “RCP2.6: Explor-
ing the Possibility to Keep Global Mean Temperature Increase 
below 2°C,” Climatic Change 109, no. 1–2 (2011): 95–116. 
 Many climate pol-
icy actors allege, however, that the IEA (which is an 
autonomous body within the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, OECD) favors 
conventional energy sources, underestimates the 
potential for the development of renewables, and is 
overly pessimistic about the chances of pursuing an 
ambitious climate change agenda. For this reason, 
the IEA’s analyses alone would not suffice to break 
the consensus around the 2°C target. This would only 
happen if similar views were heard from the UNEP in 
its Emissions Gap Report, for instance, which is written 
45  This means that after 2017, only those power plants, In-
dustrial plants, buildings, and vehicles could go into oper-
ation that emit no CO2 unless it was compensated for by 
closure of existing plants before the end of their technical 
and economic lifespan; IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012 (see 
note 9), 265. 
largely by distinguished scientists and in past issues 
has contained both dismal climate change scenarios 
and optimistic policy forecasts, a combination that is 
typical of the climate discourse in general.46
When and how the question of modifying the 2°C 
target is placed on the agenda will depend very much 
on the course and public perception of internal devel-
opments in the domains of climate policy and scien-
tific policy advice. But even if international negotia-
tions in the coming years should raise hopes that a 
comprehensive and ambitious global climate agree-
ment can be achieved, or if the scientific community 
resists declaring the core objective of international 
climate policy to be unattainable, anticipated emis-
sions trends still leave no room for any other con-
clusion than that the 2°C target is doomed to fail—at 
least in the way it is currently defined. Neither the 
UNEP nor the IEA expect that current climate policy 
will be able to prevent a marked increase in global 
emissions, which over the long term will have the 
effect of raising temperatures on the order of 3.5°C. 
With every year that global emissions of greenhouse 
gases increase, so will the pressure on the target 
formula in current use. 
 
Deliberate Modification of Assumptions in 
Climate Economics 
Global emissions budgets were originally calculated to 
make climate policy goals more accurate than would 
be possible using simple end point emissions reduc-
tion targets such as “50 percent globally by 2050.” 
This approach was also intended to create a sense of 
urgency for short- to medium-term action, above all 
through the formulation of a last possible year for 
emissions to peak in the current decade and a maxi-
mum emissions level for 2020. But sufficient momen-
tum for urgent action never picked up; global emis-
sions are still rising and the widely accepted maxi-
mum levels set for 2020 have already been exceeded 
 
46  For instance, in the second edition of this report (2011), 
the emissions gap calculated for 2020—the difference be-
tween the 2°C benchmark and current emissions trends—
is wider than in the previous year’s report. The tone of the 
report itself, however, is significantly more positive, as UNEP 
now considers manifold options for emissions reductions. 
Such options do undoubtedly exist, yet the authors investi-
gate only their technological and economic potentials and 
not their political chances for realization. See UNEP, Bridging 
the Emissions Gap. A UNEP Synthesis Report (Nairobi, 2011). 
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(see Figure 3). Therefore, if central assumptions of cli-
mate economics remain unchanged, climate science 
will soon be forced to conclusively reject the feasibility 
of the 2°C target. 
Changing specific assumptions and boundary con-
ditions is not in itself illegitimate; it is a constitutive 
element of advances in scientific knowledge. Likewise, 
the model parameters used in prominent studies of 
climate change economics such as the Stern Review 
have been the subject of rigorous scientific debate, 
although this is little-noticed in the policy-making and 
public spheres.47 But if assumptions were deliberately 
changed in order to maintain the 2°C target, this 
would certainly be motivated by climate-policy con-
siderations. This process would take place, however, 
entirely within the domain of climate science or 
scientific policy advice. These modifications would 
not be seen as politically driven, and in fact such inter-
ventions would not even be noticed by most climate 
policy actors. The knowledge base of climate science 
offers multiple starting points for such an approach, 
some of which have already been used in the recent 
past, because “often the policy demand for evaluations 
of the 2°C target has pushed modelers toward imple-
menting more optimistic assumptions for their miti-
gation portfolios.”48
Elements of a Modification 
 
An increase in the maximum reduction rates after 2020 
would have no impact on the overall size of an emis-
sions budget up to 2050. By going significantly beyond 
the usually assumed—but already quite optimistic—
feasibility limit of a global 3 percent emissions reduc-
tion per year, the models would be able to capture 
anticipated delays in reaching the emissions peak. 
This would also make it possible either to increase 
the maximum emissions level for 2020 (44 Gt CO2e), 
which was first established after the 2009 Copenhagen 
 
47  For a summary of the scientific debates around the Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change, which was commis-
sioned by the British Labour government under Tony Blair 
and very widely reported in the global media, see Hulme, 
Why We Disagree about Climate Change (see note 15), 124ff. 
48  Guivarch and Hallegatte, “2C or not 2C?” (see note 18). 
By regularly commissioning energy system transformation 
scenarios, climate policy makers today are not so interested 
in a detailed analysis of how the 2°C target could be achieved, 
but primarily in positive signals from the scientific commu-
nity that the 2°C target is still achievable. 
Climate Summit, in a gradual manner, or to do with-
out such a figure altogether. Delaying the last possible 
peak year—the central “make-or-break” point for cli-
mate policy in the carbon budget approach—could 
also be enabled by reducing the “acceptable” probability 
of staying below the 2°C limit from the approximately 67 
percent currently favored by scientific policy advisors 
to 50 percent, which would extend the remaining 
emissions budget considerably.49 The same effect 
could be achieved by increasing negative emissions in the 
second half of the twenty-first century. Most studies on 
the feasibility of the 2°C target now assume that we 
have to be able to significantly reduce the net amount 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere within a few 
decades (see Figure 4), not only through reforestation 
programs but even more through the combustion of 
fast-growing biomass in power plants and the 
subsequent capture and underground storage of the 
resulting CO2 (Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and 
Storage, BECCS).50
Consequences for EU Climate Policy and 
Climate Research 
 The assumed amount of negative 
emissions could be raised gradually to compensate for 
emissions in excess of budgets during the first half of 
the century. 
The main result of such interventions, which may 
also be combined in various ways, would be to enable 
climate policy to maintain the 2°C target for several 
years longer than originally calculated. From the per-
spective of the EU, a more “flexible approach” to piv-
otal assumptions of climate economics is by far the 
most comfortable option for modification. The con-
ditions that underpin the EU’s leadership role would 
remain intact, and the 2°C target would continue to 
function as a central reference point for climate pol-
icy. The idea that there is a clear boundary separating 
“dangerous climate change” from “non-dangerous cli-
mate change” could be maintained because the polit-
ical and economic restrictions that such a boundary 
would impose would be somewhat relaxed. And yet of 
course the world would remain in a situation where 
“time is running out,” to quote a popular metaphor. 
 
49  Malte Meinshausen et al. “Greenhouse-gas Emission 
Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2°C,” Nature 458 
(2009): 1158–62. 
50  Van Vuuren et al., “RCP2.6” (see note 44), 111ff.; UNEP, 
Emissions Gap Report 2010 (see note 18), 12f. 
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Figure 4 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Path with 
Negative Emissions 
Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2010 (see note 18), 11. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the relatively small 
amount of time that could be gained in this way 
would actually be used to turn the tide in global 
emissions. The role that climate research and 
scientific policy advice would play in this process is 
highly questionable, although it is unlikely that their 
selective interventions would become the focus of 
widespread public debate. 
Overshoot: Benchmark instead of a 
Strict Upper Limit 
A second, but much more comprehensive option for 
reinterpreting the 2°C target would consist in main-
taining the target but fundamentally changing its 
character. Instead of continuing to define 2°C as a 
strict upper limit, it would be reinterpreted as a 
benchmark or reference point that will only be achiev-
able in the long term. This would, of course, require 
an admission that it is impossible to avoid crossing 
the 2°C mark, which has been understood up to now 
as the threshold to dangerous climate change. This 
problem would be somewhat alleviated, however, by 
the promise of reversing the trend in the foreseeable 
future, and of stabilizing the increase of global mean 
temperature in the long term to below 2°C. 
Elements of a Modification 
This option could draw from the principle of tempo-
rary overshoot already established in climate science. 
In the central target categories used in climate 
modeling—atmospheric concentrations and radiative 
forcing—the general assumption is that the thresholds 
consistent with limiting the temperature increase to a 
maximum of 2°C (450 ppm CO2e and 2.6 W/m
2) will 
initially be exceeded before concentrations and forc-
ing can be reduced significantly, and will eventually 
stabilize at their equilibrium level. The IPCC’s RCP2.6 
scenario is therefore also called RCP3-PD (“peak and 
decline”). Due to the relative inertia of the climate 
system, however, it may be possible (though it is by no 
means guaranteed) that the temperature increase will 
remain below the 2°C mark during this process.51 To 
explicitly accept a temperature overshoot would be 
the next logical step. In view of faltering climate nego-
tiations and persistent increases in emissions, such 
an option has occasionally been considered within cli-
mate research, but it has also been pointed out that 
the reversal of a “temperature overshoot” may take a 
long time.52
Should the European Union agree to such an option 
and still hope to avoid the charge of arbitrariness, cer-
tain limits would have to be established, particularly 
on the maximum value beyond the 2°C mark and on 
the maximum period of time for the entire overshoot 
phase. In terms of climate policy, it would also make 
sense to delay the beginning of the overshoot period 
as long as possible to gain time for advanced adapta-
tion measures.
 
53
24
 An overshoot of 250 years, as shown 
in Figure 5 (p. ), with a maximum value of 2.8°C 
would likely be difficult to sell at first. Initially both 
of these parameters would be set much lower, for 
example, at 50 years with a maximum value of 2.3°C. 
Based on such specifications, climate economists 
could then recalculate exact emissions budgets. 
 
51  Leon Clarke et al., “International Climate Policy Architec-
tures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios,” Energy 
Economics 31 (2009): 64–81. 
52  Martin Parry, Jason Lowe, and Clair Hanson, “Overshoot, 
Adapt and Recover,” Nature 458 (2009): 1102f; Jason Lowe et 
al., “How Difficult Is It to Recover from Dangerous Levels of 
Global Warming?”, Environmental Research Letters 4, no. 1 
(2009). 
53  Manoj Joshi et al., “Projections of when Temperature 
Change Will Exceed 2°C above Pre-industrial Levels,” Nature 
Climate Change 1, no. 8 (2011): 407–12. 
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Consequences for EU Climate Policy and 
Climate Research 
The principal appeal of this approach for climate 
policy would be that the 2°C target could be main-
tained conceptually. The transition from an upper 
limit to a benchmark could be seen as an expression 
Figure 5 
Possible Temperature Paths, Interpreting the 2°C 
Target as an Upper Limit (Gray) or as a Benchmark 
(Black) 
Source: author’s illustration based on Parry, Lowe, and Hanson, 
Overshoot (see note 52), 1102. 
of a pragmatic approach to climate policy, a way for 
the EU to seize the last option available to hold on to 
the 2°C target, at least formally. However, this process 
would also need to be accompanied by a reinterpreta-
tion of the 2°C threshold itself. After all, if the thresh-
old is still relevant, why is it suddenly no longer “dan-
gerous” to cross it? And under what conditions can it 
be shifted? Furthermore, since the upper limit is evi-
dently not at 2°C, where is the “real” one? If the pub-
lic gains the justifiable impression that the threshold 
between non-dangerous and dangerous climate 
change is not one that is absolute and scientifically 
definable but rather very much open to political and 
social negotiation,54
 
54  On the debate over the possibility to define a threshold 
to “dangerous climate change,” see Suraje Dessai et al., “Defin-
ing and Experiencing Dangerous Climate Change,” Climatic 
Change 64, no. 1 (2004): 11–25; Hulme, Why We Disagree about 
Climate Change (see note 
 and furthermore that climate 
15), 191ff. 
researchers participate actively in this process, then 
the reputation of climate science—not least because of 
many prominent scientists’ earlier practice of setting 
a precise boundary—will also be at stake. 
Under certain conditions, the EU could maintain its 
leadership role in international climate policy even if 
it advocates an overshoot target, especially since it will 
continue to stand out in a positive way against major 
emitters like China, India, and Russia. If Europeans do 
not initially call their unilateral emission reduction 
targets into question, they cannot be accused of seek-
ing to reap the benefits of a target modification. The 
EU is likely to come under internal pressures in the 
medium term, however, especially if it allows other 
industrialized countries and emerging economies 
more time for emissions reductions, thus disadvantag-
ing European companies. Within the UNFCCC process, 
the strong EU position will not suffer if the Europeans 
link the overshoot option with the argument that 
developing countries need additional funding to adapt 
to climate change if the 2°C threshold is likely to 
be crossed. If climate research succeeds in coming to 
terms with the temporary overshooting of the 2°C 
target—not only intellectually, but also with its repu-
tation intact—and thus maintains its prominent role 
in the climate debate, it will be able to support the EU 
proposal in light of the lack of political alternatives. 
Even NGOs will not categorically reject the idea of an 
overshoot scenario given that their preferred target of 
1.5°C, which the UNFCCC had pursued at least as an 
option, is no longer considered tenable when under-
stood as a strict upper limit.55
Based on the lessons of past UNFCCC negotiations, 
there is no guarantee that the international commu-
nity will actually make use of the additional time that 
can be gained for climate policy through use of the 
temperature overshoot option. Failing a trend reversal 
in global emissions, negotiating governments will be 
tempted to regularly take advantage of the new tar-
get architecture in order to expand their scope of 
(in-)action without having to formally abandon the 
2°C target. If the option of a limited temperature 
overshoot is opened up even in theory, it will become 
 But the scientific com-
munity and NGOs will only consider an overshoot as 
long as they can expect governments to take the limi-
tations set on its level and duration seriously. 
 
55  UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2010 (see note 18), 26. 
Viewed from an overshoot perspective, the 1.5°C target 
no longer appears wholly unrealistic, but only less quickly 
attainable than the 2°C target. 
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a legitimate bargaining position to increase the extent 
of the overshoot and to extend its duration. This 
would gradually undermine the 2°C target. Its gover-
nance function would remain limited, and every at-
tempt to readjust the overshoot would further reduce 
its symbolic power. Since the 2°C target cannot actual-
ly fail if it is no longer understood as a strict upper 
limit, it could be retained indefinitely—similarly to 
the case with the target of 0.7 percent of donor coun-
tries’ gross national product/income for development 
aid, which was established by the UN in 1970 but is 
still unmet. Likewise, the aim of eventually reaching 
the 2°C target would never be formally abandoned, 
but beyond its use in launching periodic action plans, 
a temperature overshoot target would have little 
binding force. 
Transition to a Less Stringent Global Target 
An overshoot reinterpretation of the existing tem-
perature target may fail to generate any momentum 
in climate policy whatsoever, and in the worst case 
may ultimately even serve to mask a perpetual stand-
still. From this perspective, the formulation of an 
entirely new climate policy target seems more reason-
able. At the same time, this is a step that entails some 
risks for the EU. 
Elements of a Modification 
The option of weakening the existing target would not 
consist of specific interventions into the structure of 
emissions budgets, but would essentially mean in-
creasing the size of the budgets themselves. From the 
EU perspective, this would constitute a serious public 
relations problem. If the EU should advocate a shift to 
a 2.5°C or even 3°C target—understood as a new upper 
limit—this would be clearly identifiable to the public 
as a reduction of previous climate policy ambitions. 
The effect of this could at least be softened by simul-
taneously changing the target category. For example, 
a temperature target on the order of 2.5°C could also 
be expressed as a concentration target of 550 ppm 
CO2e or—corresponding to the logic of the new IPCC 
scenarios—as a radiative forcing target of 3.65 W/m2.56
 
56  See Rogelj et al., “Emissions Pathways” (see note 
 
19), 10. 
550 ppm would equal 2.5°C only under the assumption of a 
50 percent probability of staying below the given tempera-
Consequences for EU Climate Policy and 
Climate Research 
Regardless of what category the EU chose to express 
a weaker target, its image as a climate policy leader 
would most likely suffer. A final departure from the 
2°C target would signal not only that international 
climate policy has lowered its ambitions but also that 
quantified climate stabilization targets are always 
open for renegotiation. With a less stringent global 
target, international climate policy would be gaining 
time—not only to conclude and implement a compre-
hensive global climate agreement but also to reverse 
current trends in global emissions. Here, the question 
of whether the new target formula would ultimately 
be able to exercise a substantial governance function 
would have to initially remain open. While climate 
economics could relatively easily base emissions 
budget calculations on a revised starting point, the 
natural sciences would have to abandon the idea of a 
clear threshold to dangerous climate change.57 After 
more than two decades of statements that have em-
phatically stressed the imperative of a 2°C limit, it 
would hardly seem credible for scientific policy 
advisors to suddenly shift this threshold, especially 
since it—in contrast to the option of an overshoot—
entails a more-than-temporary weakening of climate 
stabilization objectives. This dilemma may have an 
advantage, however, in that it would shift the focus of 
scientific climate policy advice away from the natural 
sciences, with their normative tendency to pursue 
non-negotiable limits (planetary boundaries), and toward 
the social sciences, with their higher level of concep-
tual and political flexibility.58
 
ture target, which would be significantly less ambitious than 
the currently favored 67 percent. Generally, a change of tar-
get categories would have the advantage of overcoming a 
significant source of scientific uncertainty: the relation be-
tween a given greenhouse gas concentration and the result-
ant temperature effects. 
 
57  Scientific approaches to a new definition of the threshold 
have previously attempted either to offset the lack of emis-
sion reductions with additional adaptation measures or to 
reject the idea of a uniform boundary outright. See Martin 
Parry, “Closing the Loop between Mitigation, Impacts and 
Adaptation,” Climatic Change 96, no. 1-2 (2009): 23–27; Timothy 
M. Lenton, “Beyond 2°C: Redefining Dangerous Climate 
Change for Physical Systems,” WIREs Climate Change 2, no. 3 
(2011): 451–61. 
58  See Frank Biermann, “Planetary Boundaries and Earth 
System Governance: Exploring the Links,” Ecological Economics 
81 (2012) 4–9; Hans von Storch, Armin Bunde, and Nico Stehr, 
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Just how much damage would be done to the image 
of the EU would depend significantly on the behavior 
of the other major emitters as well as on the range of 
policy alternatives on hand at the particular moment 
when decisions have to be made. NGOs, developing 
countries, and climate scientists are likely to favor 
a weakened target of 2.5°C or 550 ppm over a total 
abandonment of quantified global stabilization objec-
tives. In addition, the EU’s climate policy would be 
viewed in a much more favorable light internation-
ally if the need of additional financial resources for 
adaptation measures in developing countries were 
acknowledged, and also if the current unilateral level 
of ambition (80–95 percent by 2050) were initially 
maintained. It is questionable, however, whether 
agreement on this could be reached in the context of 
the EU’s fiscal and economic policy. Under certain 
circumstances, the EU would be compelled to imple-
ment trade policy measures alongside its ambitious 
decarbonization strategy to help maintain the com-
petitiveness of European companies on the global 
market and to prevent a relocation of European indus-
try to countries without CO2 pricing, which would be 
counterproductive.59
Doing without an Exact Stabilization Target 
 
The most far-reaching option for a revision of the 
2°C target would be to reject the problem-solving 
capacity of the top-down approach in international 
climate policy. This would entail giving up the formu-
lation of a precise stabilization target as the starting 
point for calculating emissions budgets. This step 
would not only involve acknowledging that the 2°C 
target has failed, but would also signal a fundamental 
change of course in international climate policy. It 
would be based on the realization that for the foresee-
able future, the governance structures needed to con-
vert a global target (no matter what the category or 
level) into appropriate emissions reductions will be 
 
Handbook of Climate Change and Society, ed. John S. Dryzek, 
Richard B. Norgaard, and David Schlosberg (Oxford, 2012), 
113–28; Steve Rayner and Clare Heyward, “The Inevitability 
of Nature as a Rhetorical Resource,” in Anthropology and 
Nature, ed. Kerstin Hastrup (London, 2013), forthcoming. 
59  Susanne Dröge, “Using Border Measures to Address 
Carbon Flows,” Climate Policy 11, no. 5 (2011): 1191–1201; 
Daniel Gros and Christian Egenhofer, “The Case for Taxing 
Carbon at the Border,” Climate Policy 11, no. 5 (2011):  
1191–1201. 
lacking, and perhaps also on an acceptance of the 
uncertainties that exist in climate science.60
Elements of a Modification 
 
This option for target modification would refrain from 
making any promises about reaching a precise long-
term stabilization objective. The key question of how 
to provide “climate security” could then no longer be 
answered with a definition of a single global thresh-
old. Instead, the focus would be on the regionally 
specific impacts that are likely to arise from climate 
change and on improving societal capacities to cope 
with them. Emissions reductions would not decline in 
importance, they would remain essential as a means 
to reduce the pressure resulting from a changing cli-
mate. The rejection of global stabilization targets 
would bring about a dramatic shift of focus in climate 
policy. The primary emphasis would no longer be 
on seeking a “grand solution” at the global level in a 
breakthrough treaty agreement. Instead it would shift 
to pragmatically realizing the potentials for emissions 
reductions in individual countries and economic 
sectors and to significantly expanding measures to 
adapt to climate change. 
Such a policy approach could not dispense entirely 
with an overarching target—quite to the contrary. A 
new target formula must be able to cultivate symbolic 
appeal on the one hand while also fulfilling a sub-
stantial governance function on the other. This would 
only be possible with a flexible target formula. One 
conceivable means for accomplishing this would be 
to establish “climate neutrality”—the goal of reducing 
the net greenhouse gas emissions at least to the level 
of the natural rate of absorption, or even to zero—as a 
long-term global objective at the UN level.61
 
60  Maxwell T. Boykoff, David Frame and Samuel Randalls, 
“Discursive Stability Meets Climate Instability: A Critical 
Exploration of the Concept of ‘Climate Stabilization’ in Con-
temporary Climate Policy,” in Global Environmental Change 20, 
no. 1 (2010): 53–64. 
 Even if it 
meant that this climate policy vision could only be 
realized in the very long term, it would nonetheless 
chart out a clear direction in which all states and eco-
61  Within the resulting policy framework, the selective 
deployment of negative emissions technologies like BECCS 
might prove to be necessary. But as long as global emissions 
are still on the rise, it would seem politically dubious to rely 
on scenarios that are based on a global net negative emissions 
balance in the second half of the century. 
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nomic sectors need to be heading. The “all-or-nothing” 
approach that has dominated up to now would be 
replaced by the principle of (measurable) “steps in the 
right direction.” 
Consequences for EU Climate Policy and 
Climate Research 
The task for ambitious climate policy actors such as 
the EU would be to commit themselves early on to a 
challenging decarbonization path and to begin to 
prove that an emissions reduction policy is technolog-
ically feasible, is beneficial in terms of energy security, 
and is at least not economically detrimental. Moreo-
ver, this would raise the standing of flexible and in-
centive-based cooperative agreements between indi-
vidual industrialized, emerging, and developing coun-
tries.62
From today’s perspective, it is hard to imagine how 
the EU could successfully communicate this option 
for modifying the 2°C target. A key strand of the inter-
national climate discourse has consistently sought to 
create ambitious timetables for precisely specified 
stabilization targets. In this way, the desired outcome 
and ultimate success of international climate policy 
has always been represented in the mainstream dis-
course. While this “targets and timetables” approach 
may be highly attractive for communications pur-
poses, it has not brought about actual reductions in 
global emission levels. An alternative approach that 
focuses on “policies and measures” without a clear 
target for average global temperature increase or the 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases is 
extremely unappealing to the EU.
 Indeed, global agreements would continue to 
be necessary in areas such as forest protection, finan-
cial aid to developing countries, transparency in 
emissions data, and CO2 pricing. 
63
 
62  David G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock. Creating More Effec-
tive Strategies for Protecting the Planet (Cambridge, 2011), 59ff. 
 Furthermore, from 
our current perspective, it is impossible to draw any 
reliable conclusions about the potential effectiveness 
of this approach to climate policy. 
63  The situation is different in the USA, where a pragmatic 
approach is preferred even by supporters of an ambitious 
climate policy; see Nigel Purvis and Andrew Stevenson, Re-
thinking Climate Diplomacy. New Ideas for Transatlantic Cooperation 
Post-Copenhagen (Washington: The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, 2010); Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycen-
tric Climate Governance, EUI Working Papers 30/2011 (Florence, 
2011); Victor, Global Warming Gridlock (see note 62). 
A change of course in climate policy would be seen 
as inconsistent with the EU’s ascribed leadership role, 
unless significant doubts arose with regard to the top-
down approach and its capacity to address the prob-
lem, or major emitters like the USA, India, and China 
refused all other options for target modification. To 
prevent international climate policy from losing all its 
momentum, the EU would have to demonstrate effec-
tive leadership by taking action to address what has 
become an obvious failure of the prior approach; it 
would have to seize and present this failure as an op-
portunity to mark a new beginning in climate policy. 
In a flexible global climate policy regime, however, 
the EU’s unilateral emissions reduction aspiration 
would likely be below current levels (80-95 percent by 
2050), unless its economic transformation strategy has 
progressed significantly by this point or unless multi-
lateral cooperation agreements produce rapid results. 
What is completely unclear at this point is how the 
EU’s relationship with climate science would evolve. 
The rejection of a problem-centered approach with a 
precise stabilization target would certainly shift the 
balance of power in the field of scientific policy advice 
more than any other option for target modification. In 
an actor-centered approach to climate policy—one that 
relies on flexible cooperation, economic co-benefits, 
and effective adaptation measures—the need for social 
science and engineering knowledge would increase 
significantly. This would mean that in the political 
sphere there would no longer be an equivalent to the 
overly optimistic belief of the natural sciences that it 
might be possible to effectively manage natural and 
societal processes on a global scale.64
 
 Freed of any obli-
gation to respect political interests, climate research-
ers who today are among the strongest proponents of 
the EU’s aspirations in climate policy could become its 
most eloquent and powerful critics. 
 
 
64  See Mike Hulme’s contribution (“On the ‘Two Degrees’ Cli-
mate Policy Target”) in Brigitte Knopf et al., “The 2°C Target 
Reconsidered,” in Climate Change, Justice and Sustainability—Link-
ing Climate and Development Policy, eds. Ottmar Edenhofer et al. 
(Dordrecht, 2012), 121–37. 
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Conclusion 
 
The 2°C target has been of exceptional importance 
for international climate policy and scientific policy 
advice. In its present form, there will be strong pres-
sure for this target to change, however, as a rapid and 
profound trend reversal in global greenhouse gas 
emissions over the current decade is no longer likely. 
Although there are various options for a modification 
of the 2°C target, an in-depth discussion has been 
lacking until now. From the perspective of key policy 
makers and scientific policy advisors, a reinterpreta-
tion or a fundamental revision of the target entails 
high risks—not only to the image of the EU as a cli-
mate policy leader but also to the reputation of 
climate science. 
It therefore stands to reason that the EU will initial-
ly take a back seat in discussions about modifying the 
2°C target. This is because, first, Europeans take pride 
in their role in the adoption of the 2°C target at the 
UN level, which they perceive as a major climate 
policy success and one they do not want to negate. 
Second, the EU derives its own emissions reduction 
targets directly from this 2°C target, so a change 
would also undermine the architecture of European 
climate and energy policy. The EU will therefore en-
deavor to stick to the well-established target formula 
as long as possible. For this reason alone, the first step 
towards target modification—which will go largely 
unnoticed by the wider public—should come from 
climate research itself in the questionable form of a 
deliberate modification of assumptions in climate economics. 
By gradually extending the remaining global emis-
sions budgets for the period up to 2050, this approach 
could postpone the impending failure of the 2°C tar-
get, at least for a few years. Judging by currently pre-
dicted emissions increases,65 however, it seems likely 
that a further modification option will have to be used 
in the medium term.66
 
65  UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2012 (see note 
 
21), 10ff.; IEA, 
World Energy Outlook, 246 (see note 9); OECD, OECD Environmen-
tal Outlook to 2050 (see note 20), 80f. 
66  This is unless scientific policy advisors manage to aban-
don crucial “make-or-break” points that are a major part of 
the current 2°C discourse, e.g., the last possible peak year 
or the maximum emissions level in 2020. If such an approach 
were adopted, every additional year of increasing emissions 
From the present standpoint, it seems very unlikely 
that the EU will make the case for a transition to a 
less stringent global target, whether in the form of a tem-
perature target (e.g., 2.5°C), a concentration target 
(e.g., 550 ppm CO2e), or a radiative forcing target (e.g., 
3.65 W/m2). Reacting to the failure of the 2°C target 
only by setting a new upper limit would be difficult 
to communicate in a credible way. This would also 
place climate scientists in an awkward position: either 
they would have to endorse the process by moving 
the threshold of dangerous climate change67 or they 
would suffer a severe loss of influence within the 
international climate regime, which in turn would 
affect their resource endowments. It is also unlikely 
that the EU will opt for doing without an exact stabiliza-
tion target as soon as it becomes clear that modifying 
the 2°C target by changing the assumptions of climate 
economics will no longer be sufficient. Such a fun-
damental revision of the target system would have 
to be embedded in a far-reaching paradigm shift in 
climate policy.68
 
could be balanced out by a further increase in negative emis-
sions during the second half of the century, essentially pre-
venting the abandonment of the 2°C limit up to the year that 
global mean temperature actually exceeds this threshold. 
 The priority would then be more on 
achieving realistic short- to medium-term emissions 
reductions as well as comprehensive adaptation mea-
67  That this is not entirely ruled out is shown, for example, 
in statements made in an interview with the WBGU chair-
man Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber. To the question of whether 
the consequences of exceeding the 2°C threshold—which the 
WBGU was substantially involved in developing—would be 
dramatic, he responded, “[N]aturally 2.01 degrees does not 
mark the end of the world, at least not abruptly. From today’s 
scientific perspective one could maybe also live with a warm-
ing of between 2 and 3 degrees. But we should at least come 
to rest within this corridor, because beyond it, uncontrollable 
forces would come into play.” Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber in 
conversation with Olaf Stampf and Gerald Traufetter, “Tritt 
in den Hintern,” Der Spiegel, August 16, 2010: 113. 
68  Oliver Geden, “The End of Climate Policy as We Knew 
it” in Expect the Unexpected. Ten Situations to Keep an Eye on, 
SWP Research Paper 1/2012, ed. Volker Perthes and Barbara 
Lippert (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 
2012), 19–22; Marcus Carson, Tom R. Burns, and Dolores 
Calvo (eds.), Paradigms in Public Policy: Theory and Practice of 
Paradigm Shifts in the EU (Frankfurt a. M., 2009). 
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sures than on working toward quantified long-term 
objectives and a comprehensive global climate treaty. 
Not only would the EU be forced to redefine its role 
within the new international climate policy regime, 
scientific policy advisors would also be under great 
pressure to change their approach. From a European 
perspective, such a significant step will probably only 
become conceivable when all other options for target 
modification have failed. It therefore seems likely that 
for the EU, the preferable medium-term option would 
be the overshoot approach, that is, the transformation 
of the 2°C target from a strict upper limit to a mere 
benchmark for international climate policy. The most 
important political advantage of this would be that 
the EU could maintain the problem-solving approach 
that has prevailed since the adoption of the UN cli-
mate framework convention in 1992, regardless of its 
modest track record so far.69
Regardless of which modification option the EU 
prefers in the medium term and which of the con-
ceivable options prevail within international climate 
policy, the relationship between climate policy and 
climate science will inevitably have to change. The 
impending necessity to reinterpret or even revise the 
2°C target primarily marks a fundamental failure of 
international climate policy. But it also highlights 
the failure of scientific policy advice. Compared to its 
influence on other public policies and national-level 
policymaking, the influence of science on interna-
tional climate policy has always been relatively strong, 
both in terms of defining basic causal chains as well as 
 The 2°C target could be 
formally retained, natural scientists would not be 
forced to move the threshold of dangerous climate 
change, and climate economists would still be in a 
position to calculate precise emissions budgets. The 
main long-term danger of such a reinterpretation is 
that the 2°C target would lose its governance function 
entirely and serve only a symbolic and declarative 
function. 
 
69  That this option is attractive for EU climate policy can 
thus far only be deduced from statements of individual repre-
sentatives. For example, Artur Runge-Metzger, chief climate 
negotiator of the European Commission, when asked wheth-
er compliance with the 2°C limit was still realistic given the 
increasing emissions, answered: “That is certainly still pos-
sible for the long term, but it may well be that we will at 
some time temporarily exceed 2°C.” Artur Runge-Metzger 
in conversation with Marcus Pindur, “Es muss gehandelt 
werden auf internationaler Ebene,” Deutschlandradio Kultur, 
accessed June 16, 2011, http://www.dradio.de/dkultur/ 
sendungen/interview/1477900/. 
in setting the short- to medium-term agenda.70 The 
2°C target and the emissions budgets derived from it 
are only the most visible expressions of this. By the 
time policy-savvy climate scientists realize that fun-
damental assumptions of climate economics must 
deliberately be adjusted to postpone the global emis-
sions peak further, it will become clear that setting 
“scientific” climate targets to constrain the options 
available to policy makers has failed. What seemed to 
be a non-negotiable planetary boundary will be sub-
ject to (more or less publicly visible) renegotiation.71
The problem-centered modes of extensive environ-
mental governance associated with the global emis-
sions budget approach are ultimately unfeasible polit-
ically—and therefore fail to fulfill the main criterion 
for success of scientific policy advice. The dismal pros-
pects of this approach cannot be chalked up to the 
lack of effective governance structures in the domain 
of global public goods or to the divergent interests of 
industrialized, emerging, and developing countries. 
Its key weakness is the lack of consideration of crucial 
political factors, in particular the ways multilateral 
organizations, national governments, and political 
parties actually work. Not even the EU, which de-
scribes its climate policy explicitly as “science-based,” 
would actually be prepared to submit to the logic of a 
(regional) emissions budget. In the upcoming process 
of setting and implementing internal climate targets 
that are legally binding for the post-2020 period, the 
EU will not only want to remain flexible enough to 
accommodate international political conditions, the 
domestic political climate in its Member States, and 
the interests of key economic actors;
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70  Reiner Grundmann and Nico Stehr, The Power of Scientific 
Knowledge. From Research to Public Policy (Cambridge, 2012). 
 it will also have 
to refrain from using stringent budgeting mecha-
nisms to put emissions reductions at the top of the 
political agenda for the next four decades. Basing cli-
mate policy on carbon budgets is inconceivable for 
the very reason that major new findings in climate 
science, such as changes in estimates of the long-term 
71  Ted Nordhaus, Michael Shellenberger, and Linus Blom-
qvist, The Planetary Boundaries Hypothesis: Review of the Evidence 
(Oakland: Breakthrough Institute, 2012). 
72  Severin Fischer and Oliver Geden, Updating the EU’s Energy 
and Climate Policy. New Targets for the Post-2020 Period (Berlin: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2013). In the case of mid- to long-
term policymaking, political organizations usually manage 
conflicting demands by taking different (and therefore in-
consistent) positions in the areas of statements, decisions, 
and actions. See Brunsson, Organization of Hypocrisy (see 
note 36). 
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temperature increase resulting from a doubling of CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere (equilibrium climate 
sensitivity), would automatically result in emissions 
budget adjustments over which policy makers would 
have no influence.73
In the process of modifying the 2°C target, the 
working relationship between the EU and climate 
science will also change. The EU will no longer be able 
to count on climate scientists to unconditionally sup-
port its international climate policy preferences. At 
the same time, climate scientists will have to accept 
that their relatively privileged status will be limited to 
the areas of media access and research funding, where-
as their political influence will be no greater than the 
influence of scientists in other policy areas.
 
74 In this 
process, climate policy will tend to “politicize” while 
climate science will tend to “scientize.” Scientific 
policy advisors will also have to carefully examine 
their role. When appearing in the media or before 
parliamentary committees, they should not attempt 
to distill the enormous volume and range of climate 
research into explicit demands for political action. 
Rather, they should restrict themselves to presenting 
the conditions and consequences of specific policy 
alternatives.75
The history of the 2°C target clearly demonstrates 
that the establishment of an absolute climate target 
contributes little to effective risk management if 
major emitters refuse to actually implement corre-
sponding measures because the reduction paths 
appear too ambitious to them. The 2°C target might 
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Science 318 (2007): 581–82; Alexander Otto et al., “Energy 
Budget Constraints on Climate Response,” Nature Geoscience 
(2013): Advance Online Publication. 
74  Frank Nullmeier, “Neue Konkurrenzen: Wissenschaft, 
Politikberatung und Medienöffentlichkeit,” in Von der Politik- 
zur Gesellschaftsberatung. Neue Wege öffentlicher Konsultation, ed. 
Claus Leggewie (Frankfurt a. M. and New York, 2007), 171–80. 
75  Pielke, Honest Broker (see note 11); Ottmar Edenhofer and 
Martin Kowarsch, A Pragmatist Concept of Scientific Policy Advice 
(Berlin: Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons 
and Climate Change, 2012). According to Edenhofer and 
Kowarsch (22), the presentation of alternatives would lead 
to a situation in which “politicians can no longer legitimate 
policy options by referring either to an alleged ‘inherent 
necessity’ of a certain policy option based on a (pseudo) 
scientific consensus on it, or to uncertainties and disagree-
ment in sciences.” Such an approach would require not only 
first-best but also second-best policy scenarios. See Brigitte 
Knopf, Gunnar Luderer, and Ottmar Edenhofer, “Exploring 
the feasibility of low stabilization targets,” WIREs Climate 
Change 2 no. 4 (2011): 617–26. 
have worked well as a focal point for climate policy 
formulation,76 but it has clearly failed as a focal 
point for appropriate action. Furthermore, unrealistic 
pledges send the signal that they can be disregarded 
with few political or reputational consequences.77
List of Abbreviations 
 A 
more pluralistic approach in scientific advice to cli-
mate policy makers could result in a more pluralistic 
understanding of “legitimate” policy options. Climate 
policy makers would be better informed and thus 
better able to assess the trade-offs linked with differ-
ent policy options and to decide what is realistically 
attainable. A global climate target can only promote 
successful problem solving if it fulfills both a positive 
symbolic and a productive governance function. 
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